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Apart from the need to recognize most existing land uses as legi-
timate, those who prepare zoning maps have considerable discretion in
drawing district boundary lines to regulate growth and land develop-
ment in the manner that they regard as appropriate. Most land uses
are not so exacting in their physical location requirements as to pre-
vent their being incorporated into a well thought out zoning plan with
reasonable comfort. A troublesome exception is removal of minerals
from the ground. Where the materials are known to exist, the zoning
authorities must either permit extraction or attempt to prohibit it,
thus shutting off a source of supply that is presumably valuable to the
community. Miners do not dig for fun; they perform a necessary ser-
vice. The problem is further complicated by the fact that mineral re-
moval operations are, at least aesthetically, incompatible with many
other kinds of land uses. It is primarily for these reasons that the
drilling for oil, the extraction of sand and gravel, and the mining of
other minerals have produced so much zoning controversy and liti-
gation.
This article will describe the various statutes that have dealt
with this problem in the State of Michigan, set forth the questions
which have been settled and those which remain unresolved, and
offer this author's critique of the present situation and suggestions
for the future.
II. MICHIGAN APPELLATE DECISIONS AND STATUTORY PRO-
VISIONS
In 1929, during the earliest era of zoning, the Michigan Supreme
Court decided City of North Muskegon v. Miller.
1 The city of North
Muskegon had adopted an ordinance regulating the drilling of oil
wells and a zoning ordinance. It asserted both ordinances against
an effort to drill an oil well on the property in question. The regula-
* Private practice, Ann Arbor, Mich., J.D., 1952, University of Michigan.
1. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
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tory ordinance was upheld.2 The court stated that it applied to the
property in question because of the proximity of a well producing
about half the city's water supply.3 The zoning ordinance was held
void on the ground that it was confiscatory. 4 The court stated:
The courts have particularly stressed the importance of not
destroying or withholding the right to secure oil, gravel, or
mineral (sic) from one's property, through zoning ordi-
nances, unless some very serious consequences will follow
therefrom.
5
Technically the invalidation of the zoning ordinance and the fore-
going comment were dictum. Nonetheless, Miller has become Michi-
gan's landmark zoning case involving the extractive industries.
Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township involved a gyp-
sum mine and plant located on a large tract of land, part of which
was zoned for industrial use and the rest for agricultural use. The
pertinent ordinance provided that some of the agricultural land
could be used for industrial purposes if a conditional use permit
was obtained. The manufacture of gypsum was one of numerous
kinds of industry which required a special use permit in either
district. The issues, arising from the refusal of the township to
grant a conditional use permit, were many and varied.7 The town-
ship and some of its residents were concerned about dust and vi-
bration from the underground blasting involved, surface subsidence
and truck traffic. The gypsum company pointed out that this was
one of only three commercial deposits of gypsum discovered within
the state of Michigan. The company also stressed that its operations
would create 250 new jobs, and insisted that cost factors required
2. Id. at 60, 227 N.W. at 745.
3. Id. at 62, 227 N.W. at 746.
4. Id. at 59, 227 N.W. at 745.
5. Id. at 57, 227 N.W. at 744.
6. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958). The Michigan Court consolidated two cases
involving the same parties, Certain-Teed Products Corporation, a Maryland corporation;
and Paris Township, a Michigan political subdivision. In the first action, plaintiff Certain-
Teed was appealing the Township Board's decision to deny Certain-Teed's application for
an extension of the current industrial zone to permit the construction of a gypsum manu-
facturing plant and to allow the mining of gypsum as a permitted use under current zoning
regulations. In the second action, Certain-Teed sought a declaratory decree permitting the
company to proceed with its plant construction and a declaratory decree that the county
was without authority to prevent the mining of gypsum. The company had promised to
carry out its mining operations using modern procedures which would prevent injury to
surface owners. The circuit court held the Township's denial of the application a legitimate
exercise of the zoning authority and that the action of the Township Board was not arbi-
trary or capricious. The circuit court also denied the request for declaratory decree stating
that the present zoning ordinance was neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional as viola-
tive of due process.
7. Seven members of the eight man court took part in this decision which consists of
two opinions. The first opinion, written by Edwards, J., and concurred in by Carr, J.,
held: (1) that the Township Board's actions in denying the zoning application were arbi-
trary and capricious and the implementation of the ordinance unreasonable as the Board
applied It, and (2) that declaratory relief should be granted authorizing Certain-Teed to
proceed with the mining and manufacturing of gypsum under restrictions included in the
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processing the gypsum at the mine head. The township involved
was located several miles from the city of Grand Rapids and was
just beginning to feel the pressure of suburban housing develop-
ment.8
The opinion of Justice Edwards, upheld the requirement of a con-
ditional use permit for gypsum manufacture and found the numer-
ous standards for administrative decision, which were set forth in
the ordinance to be adequate. 9 It also upheld, in principle, an ordi-
nance provision permitting the extension of industrial use for a
distance of 1000 feet into an agricultural zone upon special ap-
proval. 10 On the facts however, the opinion reversed the lower
court saying that it appeared that township officials had buckled
under political pressure and unreasonably refused the requested
permit." The opinion describes the hearing given the petitioner as
cursory.
2
The gypsum company had agreed to use a blasting technique to
minimize shock and vibrations, to take precautions to assure that
soil subsidence would not follow the mining, to install modern air
pollution control devices and to protect and save harmless the water
supply of neighboring property owners from either diminution or
pollution." s It was held that the circuit court could exercise juris-
diction to assure compliance with these representations. 4
It was further held that on the facts, the plaintiff had not estab-
lished his right to extend the industrial area. 5 The court was
influenced on this aspect by the admission of plaintiff that it could
locate its plant and mine head entirely inside the existing industrial
zone. The court left the question of extension of the industrial zon-
ing area to determination after a reapplication and presentation
of the matter on the merits. 6
The court then addressed itself to the question of whether the
zoning enabling act 7 authorized prohibition of deep mining in town-
ship zoning ordinances.' The trial court had ruled that the act did
opinion. Kelly, J., concurred in the result of this opinion. The second opinion, written by
Black, J., and concurred in by Dethmers, C. J., Smith and Voelker, J. J., concurred with
the first- holding of the first opinion On the issue of declaratory relief, these judges de-
nied it as improvident.
8. Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 443, 88 N.W.2d 705,
710 (1958).
9. Id. at 465, 88 N.W.2d at 721.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 448, 88 N.W.2d at 712.
12. Id.
18. Id. at 442, 88 N.W.2d at 709.
14. Id. at 465, 88 N.W.2d at 721.
15. Id. at 455, 88 N.W.2d at 716.
16. Id.
17. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.271 (1967).
18. Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 459, 88 N.W.2d 705.
718 (1958).
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privide such authority.1 9 Some courts have held that this activity
could be restrained by zoning ordinances and others have held to
the contrary, 20 but it was noted that the facts in the various situa-
tions differed with respect to the character of the area involved and
the impact that the particular operation would have.21 The court
concluded that with respect to surface mining, the test is the rela-
tionship of the ordinance, under the circumstances, to the public
welfare.2 2 With respect to deep mining, the court held that to the
extent that plaintiff could effectively mine without any interference
with normal surface uses and living, a zoning prohibition would
be clearly unconstitutional as not related to any public need.28 This
of course led the court to consider the prospective surface mani-
festations of the operation involved. On the record presented, it
was determined that the claims of possible surface subsidence,
threatened damage to homes through blasting and interference with
wells were not valid reasons for preventing the mining, because of
the ability of the court to regulate the operation to assure the plain-
tiff paid for any damage and to prevent activities that would amount
to a nuisance.24
The court had more difficulty with the. fact that three small
buildings would be erected. They concluded however, that this was
a minor variation not inconsistent with agricultural zoning.
25
The court made the following observation:
It is apparent that this is an industry which, if it is to exist
anywhere, must exist here. We believe the public policy of
the State is calculated to encourage both manufacturing
and mining. . . . In the administration of our zoning laws,
while we seek to protect our homes, we must likewise take
into account the public interest in the encouragement of full
employment and vigorous industry.
26
This was followed by a direction instructing the trial court to reverse
its decision and enter a decree conditioning plaintiff's right to mine
upon performance of the representations made. 27 The trial court was
also directed to retain jurisdiction and the plaintiff was warned it




20. Id. at 460-61, 88 N.W.2d at 719.
21. Id. at 461, 88 N.W.2d at 719.
22. Id. at 462, 88 N.W.2d at 719.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 463, 88 N.W.2d at 720.
25. Id. at 464, 88 N.W.2d at 720.
26. Id. at 464, 88 N.W.2d at 721.
27. Id. at 465, 88 N.W.2d at 721.
28. Id.
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The majority opinion agreed that the record failed to show any
dire community need which would result in some very serious con-
sequence unless the ordinance were enforced against plaintiff.29
However, the opinion indicated that the case was not yet ready for
the declaratory relief proposed by Justice Edwards. 0 The opinion
made a frequently quoted statement:
Here we have no mere zoning case. Its impact without doubt
will be felt for years to come in great areas of Michigan where
zoning is as yet unknown.8 '
The majority thought the case should be decided upon nuisance
grounds and that more pleadings and proofs were necessary. s 2 It was
noted that the courts were being asked to approve an experiment
with new techniques and methods.
In result, the difference between the justices revolved around whe-
ther or not a decree attempting to permit the operation while, at the
same time, imposing necessary regulation, should be drafted immedi-
ately or after further testimony.
It is clear that all felt that it was not appropriate to prevent
the mining and manufacturing operations as long as the representa-
tions with respect to nuisance and other aspects were performed.
Shortly before Paris, the Michigan Supreme Court had decided
Bloomfield Township v. Beardslee s In that case the operator of a
gravel pit, anticipating the exhaustion of the deposit he was working,
bought some land nearby and attempted to expand operations into it.
Up to the time of trial, only 1000 yards of gravel had been removed
from the property in question and all crushing, screening and stock-
piling for sale had been conducted on the site of the old pit. The area
was one which was in the process of development as expensive single
family homes. The old pit had been operated as a nonconforming use
and there was no question as to the right of the owner to continue
there. Three of the members held that the zoning ordinance was valid
as to the property because of the character of the neighborhood and
the fact that the land had substantial value for residential uses. 4
They also held that because of the small scale of the operations, no
lawful nonconfroming use had been established prior to adoption of
the zoning ordinance.83
However, four other justices disagreed. Citing to Miller,"8 they
29. Id. at 467, 88 N.W.2d at 722.
80. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 468-69, 88 N.W.2d at 723.
33. 849 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
34. Id. at 301, 84 N.W.2d at 539.
35. Id. at 309, 84 N.W.2d at 543.
s6. City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
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expressed their concern over the use of zoning ordinances to prevent
mineral removal.37 They held that the operation should be enjoined
purely on public nuisance grounds in view of the character of the
neighborhood.3 8
In Beardslee there was no clear majority, but it does appear that
as a result of Michigan's first three cases the "very serious con-
sequence" doctrine became well established. There is, however,
little guidance in these decisions as to what constitutes a "very serious
consequence".
The city of Bloomfield Hills is one of America's most famous sub-
urbs. Most of it is occupied by the large and expensive homes of "cap-
tains of the automobile" and other industries on very large lots front-
ing on quiet residential streets. The rolling, partly wooded countryside
is in marked contrast with the flat lands which comprise so much of
the Detroit suburban fringe. In this setting arose the case of Buckley
v. Bloomfield Hills,3 9 where the city attempted to prevent the removal
of sand and dirt to 'lower a hill to a level of 2 feet above the adjacent
road. A suit by the owner and the sand company was dismissed by the
trial court.4 1 The city maintained that the plaintiffs were carrying on
a commercial sand and gravel business in a residential zone.4 2 The
Michigan Supreme Court agreed that if such were the primary object,
the purpose and effect of this activity would violate the zoning ordi-
nance. 43 However, the plaintiffs asserted that the changing of the
contour of the soil was necessary to make the land suitable for the
construction of dwellings." They insisted that they were doing nothing
more than preparing the land for uses allowed by the ordinance.
45
On the record, the court agreed.46 It held that the transformation of a
Bloomfield hill to a Bloomfield flat did not violate the ordinance and
then went on to say that:
No possible relationship to public health, safety, morals or the
general welfare can be conceived for a regulation under the
police power that the land zoned for residential purposes shall
be kept hilly rather than made flat. In the absence of testi-
mony establishing the relationship an ordinance so requiring
would necessarily be held unreasonable and invalid.4
37. Bloomfield Township v. Beardslee, 349 Mich. 296, 310, 84 N.W.2d 537, 544 (Black,
J., Concurring).
38. Id. at 810, 311, 84 N.W.2d at 544.
39. 343 Mich. 83, 72 N.W.2d 210 (1955).
40. Id. at 84-85, 72 N.W.2d at 211.
41. Id. at 85, 72 N.W.2d at 211.




46. Id. at 86, 72 N.W.2d at 212.
47. Id.
346
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Recognizing that any other construction would render the ordi-
nance invalid, the court held that the ordinance did not prevent re-
moval. 48 It also said that an unduly protracted operation, with re-
moval geared to market demand, would constitute a gravel busi-
ness. 9 The court remanded the matter to the trial court with direc-
tions to enter a decree fixing a reasonable time limit and restricting
the area of removal operations to avoid aihy dangerous condition.
This decision was unanimous.5 0
The foregoing cases constitute the total message from the Supreme
Court of Michigan with respect to the application of zoning laws to
mineral removal operations. However, Michigan's intermediate court,
the Court of Appeals, was established in 1964 and has dealt with the
problem on several occasions.
In Bristow v. Woodhaven,51 the Court of Appeals estab-
lished Michigan's celebrated "preferred use" doctrine under which
the presumption of validity of a zoning ordinance was held
to disappear when the complaining property owner established
that the zoning ordinance excluded from the community his pro-
posed use of the property in question and that use was regarded by
the courts as a preferred use.5 2 Preferred uses were rather vaguely
defined as certain uses generally recognized by constitution, statute,
or court decision as being valuable and necessary to the general
welfare.5 3 Bristow involved a mobile home park. An interesting
aspect of this decision is that Miller5 4 and Paris55 were among the
decisions most heavily relied upon to establish the doctrine.
A number of cases were decided by the court of appeals on the ba-
sis of the "preferred use" doctrine announced in Bristow. The only one
that bears on our subject is Jamens v. Shelby Township.58 That case
involved a township zoning ordinance and a landfill regulation ordi-
nance which were upheld to prevent the plaintiffs from using their
land for the removal of fill sand on the theory that the record did
not show evidence to overturn the presumption of validity of a mu-
nicipal ordinance. 7 The facts indicated that, although there were
some uses nearby that were not conducive to the single family resi-
dential use for which the property was zoned, there was a new resi-
dential area immediately to the south of the site. Two judges signed
the majority opinion, which did not refer to the "preferred use" doc-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 87, 72 N.W.2d at 212.
51. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322, denying appeal to, 386 Mich. 764 (1971).
52. Id. at -, 192 N.W.2d at 328.
53. Id. at , 192 N.W.2d at 325.
54. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
55. Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
56. 41 Mich. App. 461, 200 N.W.2d 479 (1972).
57. Id. at -, 200 N.W.2d at 485.
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trine. However, a concurring opinion, did discuss Bristow,58 Miller,59
and Paris,6 0 and pointed out that the record did not show how much
sand existed on the property, what need there was for the sand, how
it would be removed so as not to injure nearby property, or how
long the mining would continue, and that, therefore, the existence
of a preferred use had not been established.6 1
The "preferred use" doctrine, born in the Bristow6 2 decision of
July, 1971, passed away suddenly in February, 1974 when the Michi-
gan Supreme Court decided Kropf v. Sterling Heights.6 3 That decision,
which did not involve mineral removal, held that the "preferred use"
doctrine was an incorrect view of the law. However, the court did not
criticize Paris6 4 or Miller" and it should be kept in mind that the "pre-
ferred use" doctrine involved questions of burden of proof and the na-
ture of a presumption, rather than sustantive law.
Michigan,66 like many other states, 67 permits by statute the con-
tinuation, but not the expansion of nonconforming uses lawfully
begun prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance. In the eyes
of many people, open pit mining operations frustrate these rules
because as the operation continues, the hole gets bigger, and it
is easy to regard this as expansion. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals tackled this problem in Fredal v. Forster.6 8 The case involved
approximately 160 acres of land that had been used for the min-
ing of sand and gravel. While parts of the property had been worked
rather extensively and continuously for a number of years, other
portions of the land had been worked only sporadically, and approxi-
mately a quarter of the property had not been used at all.6 Although
earlier zoning had permitted mining on this property, after the con-
struction of a subdivision nearby the zoning had been changed.70
The case involved the extent of the right to continue the mining opera-
tion.
The trial court found abandonment of the nonconforming use
as to most of the property and that continued operation constituted
58. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
59. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
60. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
61. Jamens v. Shelby Township, 41 Mich. App. 461, 200 N.W.2d 479, 487 (1972).
62. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
63. 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
64. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
65. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
66. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 125.216, 125.286, 125.583(a) (1967). See generally 1
ANOERSON, AmERICAN LAw OF ZONN4O §§ 6.01-6.71 (1968).
67. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-13 (1960) (authorizing as lawful the continuing use
of land existing at the time of adoption of an ordinance), and V§ 40-05-01(34), 40-05-02(24)
(dealing with the public welfare power of cities which authorizes them to remove hazardous
structures. See also City of Minot v. Fisher, 212 N.W.2d 837 (1973).
68. 9 Mich. App. 215, 156 N.W.2d 606 (1968).
69. Id. at -, 156 N.W.2d at 609.
70. Id. at -, 156 N.W.2d at 610.
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a public nuisance because of noise, dust and smell.7 1 With respect
to the southern part of the property, it found that a lawful non-
conforming use existed. 2
The court of appeals first determined that the removal of 50,000
cubic yards of material over a 3 year period was a "substantial" oper-
ation establishing a vested interest in the continuation of a noncon-
forming -use.7 3 It went on to hold that a nonconforming use, once
established, is not lost merely by nonuse.
7 4
The Court then faced the problem of the extent of the right of non-
conforming use,75 citing earlier Michigan cases76 holding that an en-
tire parcel may not be reserved for a nonconforming use by beginning
such a use on merely a portion thereof, and that municipalities have
no power to limit the time of duration of a nonconforming use. It also
threw in the complication of the rule of Miller that mineral removal
should not be prohibited except where some very serious consequence
will result.
77
In order to resolve the controversy, it was ruled that the right to
continue a nonconforming use in this kind of case entitles the owner to
continue working existing holes no -natter how large they get, and that
the prohibition against expansion prevents the digging of any new holes
in areas not previously excavated.78 Thus, the value of the right de-
pends upon the geology of the area. If there are continuous deposits of
valuable material, work may go on until the entire property is used.
However, if the materials turn out to be scattered, operations must
cease when existing holes are fully worked out.
The court tempered its decision with a ruling that a nonconform-
ing use of this type is terminable when, because of development of the
surrounding area, it becomes an unreasonable interference with the
rights of others and, hence, a nuisance.
7 9
Early in 1970, mainly through the efforts of young people in col-
leges and universities around the country, America suddenly made
an amazing discovery-the environment. As a result, new considera-
tions have been added to the decision making process in most land
use matters. The Michigan legislature adopted an environmental
protection act,80 which gave virtually everyone standing to sue vir-
tually everyone else to prevent pollution, destruction or impairment
of natural resources.8' It also directed all administrative agencies to
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 156 N.W.2d at 613-14.
74. Id. at - 156 N.W.2d at 614.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at -, 156 N.W.2d at 616.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 (Supp. 1974).
81. Id. § 691.1202.
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consider the environmental aspects in matters pending before them. 2
The only two zoning cases involving mineral removal decided since
the great discovery are Jamens,8 and Lyon Sand and Gravel Co. v.
Oakland Township.8 4 In the latter, plaintiff was prohibited by both a
zoning ordinance and a mineral removal ordinance from extracting
sand and gravel from the property involved. Plaintiff attacked both
ordinances in the trial court and won. Plaintiff established that the
township had a population of 2500 which was expected to grow to 5400
by 1980; that the area in which the land is located is used for farms,
residences, and other gravel pits; that there were about 5 million
tons of gravel on the property involved which was required for road
construction and building; that limitation on the availability thereof
would hamper commercial and residential development; that it would
take 10 years to remove the gravel; that plaintiff would use modern
methods to substantially eliminate noise and dust and would create
an artificial berm to visually screen the excavation; that after the
mining was completed a sizable lake, protecting the surrounding
water table, would result; and that homes would be built. 5 The court
cited Miller 8 and Paris7 and declared the zoning ordinance to be
"'unreasonable and confiscatory as applied."881 The regulatory ordi-
nance had been set aside by the trial court for lack of administrative
standards necessary to determine whether to grant or deny a permit.
The court of appeals concurred and also took exception to a depth
limit provision which, it said, would prevent the removal of any sub-
stantial amount of gravel. It also found that performance standards
regarding noise would have prevented mining and could not be sus-
tained.
Lyon is disappointing in that the decision rests entirely upon tradi-
tional grounds and arguments and the court does not discuss the envi-
ronmental aspects of mimeral removal operations, although it might
well have done so because of the fact that the environment was so
commonly in the news and talked about at that time. However, after
reiterating that public policy favors permitting the taking of minerals
from the ground it stated: ". . .outright prohibition of the taking is
in fact confiscation rather than conservation.
89
The foregoing are all of the zoning cases involving mineral re-
moval which have been decided by Michigan's Appellate Courts. Be-
fore analyzing the state of the law, it should be noted that in addition
82. Id. § 691.1205(2).
83. 41 Mich. App. 461, 200 N.W.2d 479.
84. 33 Mich. App. 614, 190 N.W.2d 354 (1971).
85. Id. at -, 190 N.W.2d at 355-56.
86. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
87. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
88. Id. at 617, 190 N.W.2d at 356.
89. 33 Mich. App. 614, 616, 190 N.W.2d 354, 356 (1971).
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to the environmental protection act90 previously mentioned, zoning
enabling acts specifically prohibit counties and townships from regu-
lating the location of oil or gas wells, leaving this to a state official. 91
Cities and villages are not so restricted.
92
III. SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHED LAW
From Miller,9 Paris" and Lyon 5 it appears established that zon-
ing cases involving mineral removal willbe treated in a slightly differ-
ent manner than the ordinary zoning case with respect to the question
of what the record must show to sustain or invalidate a restriction on
removal. In view of the recent rise and fall of the preferred use doc-
trine, it is a bit dangerous to speak broadly in terms of presumption or
burden of proof. However, Miller and Paris were decided long before
the preferred use doctrine was formulated and Lyon was decided a few
weeks before the doctrine was announced in Bristow and by a different
panel of judges. It seems clear that if the record shows a public
need for the minerals sought to be removed, it must also show some
serious consequence if a restriction on removal is to be sustained.
In Miller, a potential hazard to an established municipal water
supply was held to justify refusal to permit an oil well .96 In Paris,
the trial court was directed to permit mining only under such terms
as would assure that the miner made good on promises to avoid sig-
nificant dust problems and undue vibration from blasting and to mine
in such a manner as to prevent later surface subsidence.97 The miner
was also required to protect and save harmless the water supply of
neighboring owners from either diminution or pollution.
Buckley98 permitted removal on he ground that a property own-
er has a right to contour his land to make it more desirable, in his own
eyes, for uses permitted under the zoning ordinance, thus creating
a new and separate theory under which a miner may sustain his
operations where the mere leveling of hills or creation of lakes and
ponds is involved. , Although the court did not rule out the possibil-
ity of preventing a lowering of the grade if it could be established that
the maintenance of the existing grade had some substantial rela-
tionship to the public health, safety and welfare, the justices, ap-
parently in recognition of the fact that land grades are often changed
very substantially without any great harm resulting, said that they
90. MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 (Supp. 1974).
91. Id. §§ 125.201, 125.271.
92. See d. § 125.31 et seq.
93. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
94. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
95. 33 Mich. App. 614, 190 N.W.2d 354 (1971).
96. 249 Mich. 52, 62, 227 N.W. 743, 746 (1929).
97. 351 Mich. 434, 465, 88 N.W.2d 705, 721.
98. 343 Mich. 83, 72 N.W.2d 210 (1955).
99. See id.
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could not conceive of any such relationship without proof. 00 Buckley
also ruled that removal operations to change grade may be regu-
lated to prevent leaving the property in a dangerous condition and
to keep a purported land balancing act from becoming a mere guise
for a commercial gravel pit in 'a residential zone. 1 1
With respect to the right to continue lawful nonconforming uses,
most of the law centers around requirements for establishing the
right. Beardslee 0 2 holds that the sporadic removal of 1,000 yards of
gravel is not enough. 03 Freda °10 4 holds that 50,000 yards is enough. 03
Presumably the boundary lies somewhere in between. Perhaps it
also depends upon the other circumstances of the case.
With respect to the question of what constitutes expansion and
what amounts to mere continuation of a lawful non-conforming use,
we have only the Fredal decision to guide us. The notion that the
right to go on and on depends upon the quirks of glacial geology seems
a crude basis for a rule of law. Certainly, such a rule would tempt
the operator to dig through unusable materials in the hopes of reach-
ing valuable minerals farther on, thus wasting substantial quantities
of energy and creating the kinds of nuisances that lead to regulation
of open pit mininig in the first place.
IV. THE UNDECIDED QUESTIONS-SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR
RESOLUTION
The frontier between continuing nonconforming use and unlawful
expansion might be resolved by either the legislature or the courts
by setting an area or volume limit to continued operation, based
on the extent of the previous operation, once a zoning ordinance
forbidding mining takes effect. Possibly, if a municipality incorpor-
ated such a rule in its zoning ordinance, the courts would uphold
it. However, it may be a waste of effort to attempt to establish
any limit of this sort, because when the limit is reached, if valuable
deposits remain, the owner will probably attack the reasonableness
of the zoning ordinance either on the Buckley plan, where he main-
tains that he is merely preparing the land for uses permitted under
the ordinance, or under the Miller-Paris doctrine where he will show
a need for the minerals and claim that no serious consequence
will result from removal.
Cases arising under the Buckley doctrine may present a question
of what constitutes mere mineral removal and what constitutes a
100. Id. at 86, 72 N.W.2d at 212.
101. Id. at 85-86, 72 N.W.2d at 212.
102. 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
103. Id. at 806-09, 84 N.W.2d at 542-48.
104. 9 Mich. App. 215, 156 N.W.2d 606 (1968).
105. Id. at -, 166 N.W.2d at 613-14.
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commercial mining operation. The Buckley opinion suggested that
it might be a matter of intent. 10 6 Often the question of processing
comes up in sand and gravel operations. Ordinarily, it is much
cheaper for the gravel miner to crush, sort, mix and perform various
other processing operations at the site of gravel removal. While
these activities can be done elsewhere, the added cost may make
the operation noncompetitive. On the other hand, processing opera-
tions, and particularly the operation of a rock crusher, 'are extremely
noisy and sometimes result in significant dust nuisances. Although
there are no actual decisions in point, it would seem fairly evident
that the operator who conducts processing operations is likely to
be held to be running a commercial mine rather than merely lower-
ing the contour of land for uses permitted under the zoning ordi-
nance. It is not realistic to apply a simple test of Whether or not
the minerals are being sold, since that fact, in itself, has no bearing
on the annoyance caused to neighbors or the potential disfigurement
of the landscape. Likewise, it would seem that some minor process-
ing operations, not involving excessive or different kinds of noise
or dust, should not be determinative. Among other things, perform-
ing some of these operations at the site undoubtedly saves a certain
amount of trucking which, in itself, may be one of the nuisance
aspects of the operation and, in any event, consumes considerable
energy. Trucking is reduced because useless materials are separat-
ed and not hauled away from the site.
In Buckley apart from the processing aspects, commercial oper-
ations were distinguished from mere lowering of the land contour
by sporadic operations tailored to the demands of the marketplace
from time to time. While this decision seems perfectly reasonable
in the context in which made, a rather small gravel removal oper-
ation in a residential area, it might be questionable on environmental
grounds if applied to a substantial project. If material is removed
faster than it can be absorbed by the market, it must be taken
somewhere and stored. This means extra 'loading, unloading and
hauling, all of which consumes substantial energy. Furthermore,
it means that the total operation will intrude on not one but two
neighborhoods. Altogether, the total environmental impact is increas-
ed, and in many situations this should be regarded as unsatisfactory.
Perhaps it is not too radical to suggest that whether or not
the operation is commercial in nature is a poor test. A better
one would be whether or not the land is being lowered in a manner
which strikes the most reasonable balance between the interests
of the neighbors in not being annoyed, the interests of the community
in making the best use of land and materials with the least environ-
106. See 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
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mental impact, and the interest of the landowner and miner in
attempting, like everyone else, to do as well for themselves as
possible. Such a rule would enable the courts to decide each case
on its merits, rather than on a lot of fine points of precedent,
and provides a sound basis for imposing restrictions on operations
which are permitted to proceed.
When we come to cases where the landowner and miner rely
upon the serious consequences rule, we can easily get into some
rather wide differences of opinion as to what kind of consequence
is serious. To a member of the Sierra Club, the leveling of a
lakeside sand dune to provide the very special kind of sand needed
by foundries is clearly a very serious consequence. However, to
the mother who must frequently climb it, carrying a picnic basket
while leading her children to and from the beach, removal of the
dune may seem like a very good -idea. Perhaps the resolution of
this particular conflict depends upon the number of lakeside sand
dunes in the region and whether or not a substantial number are
guaranteed preservation by being held by the public for parks or
otherwise made unavailable to sand mining.
In certain situations a miner might be inclined to seek judicial
approval of his activity by pointing out that it is a temporary
use only and the annoyance to neighbors will not be of long duration.
The argument is especially perguasive where the vicinity is begin-
ning to change from rural to urban or suburban in character,
because prompt removal, before the area builds up, means annoy-
ance to less people. The cases cited above do not discuss this
kind of argument directly, but the Paris decision, requiring regula-




In Miller, Michigan adopted the popular rule that a zoning ordi-
nance which, because of its restrictions on use and development,
renders valuable property substantially worthless, is invalid.10 8 How-
ever, the Michigan courts have often held that a zoning ordinance
does not have to permit the highest and best economic use of
land and that an ordinance which causes some reduction in the
value of a parcel is not necessarily invalid where the property
has substantial value for permitted uses. 09 The Michigan courts
have never addressed themselves to application of these rules to
the situation where a party who is blocked by a zoning ordinance
from removing 'minerals does not actually own the land but only,
the mineral rights therein. Very likely this question will arise at
107. See 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
108. 249 Mich. 59, 227 N.W. 745 (1929).
109. See Reibel v. Birmingham, 23 Mich. App. 732, 177 N.W.2d 243 (1970).
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some time, because it is extremely common for companies involved
in mineral removal operations to purchase only mineral rights entit-
ling them to enter the property and remove the minerals, without
actually buying the land. Very frequently these purchases are made
many years in advance of projected operation to assure reserve
supplies, and it is not uncommon for substantial sums of money to
change hands at the time the mineral rights are sold. In view
of the rapid spread of zoning controls in recent years over lands
formerly unzoned, it seems certain that conflicts will result. The
peculiar problem, of course, is whether if a zoning ordinance pre-
vents the removal of minerals which have been bought by a mining
or other extractive company, the mineral rights are thereby rendered
substantially worthless unless oil or other minerals can be extracted
by operations conducted on nearby property which is zoned for
this use. Nonetheless, even though the mineral interests may be
rendered worthless, the land may retain substantial value for per-
mitted uses. The courts are going to have to decide whether or
not to hold zoning ordinances void in such situations.
The problem may be even more complicated, as distinctions
may be made as to whether or not the mineral interest was sep-
arated from the fee prior to the intervention of the zoning ordinance.
If it is held that a zoning ordinance may not destroy the value
of previously acquired mineral rights, the courts may consider it
necessary to refuse to apply the same rule where the rights are
acquired after the ordinance is adopted to avoid making zoning
a virtually useless tool for restricting mineral removal.
Additional complications may arise out of sales of mineral inter-
ests where the purchaser is entitled to a refund or cancelation
if prevented from removing the minerals by public regulation. Very
probably the rather celebrated decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 10 will receive considerable
attention. It was there held that the police power of the state could
not be used to prevent coal mining in order to protect surface
owners from soil subsidence so as to defeat the rights of a miner
who had previously acquired the mineral rights."'
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act gives virtually any-
one or anybody standing to maintain an action against anyone else
for "the protection of the air, water and other natural resources
and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion. ' 12 Where the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that de-
fendant has or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy, the defendant
110. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
111. Id. at 414.
112. MiCH. COmp. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1974).
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may show, as an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible
and prudent alternative to his conduct and that such conduct is
consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety and wel-
fare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection
of its natural resources. 113 This statute has been hung from a pro-
vision of Michigan's 1963 constitution which reads as follows:
The conservation and development of the natural resources
of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public
concern in the interest of the health, safety and general wel-
fare of the people. The legislature shall provide for the pro-
tection of the air, water and other natural resources of the
state from pollution, impairment and destruction."
4
Although the Supreme Court has not yet passed on the constitution-
ality of the statute, it is widely regarded as being valid, at least
as a general proposition.'" 5 Presumably there may be attempted
applications of it that violate due process, equal protection, or other
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has recently ruled that
the constitutional provision was mandatory upon the legislature and
that the environmental protection act was an appropriate response,
but the constitutionality of the act was not in question." 6
Because the act requires that environmental impact be consid-
ered in all administrative or other proceedings and that pollution,
impairment or destruction shall not be authorized so long as there
is a feasible and prudent alternative, the statute directly affects
any zoning action involving mineral removal.
The language of the act is extremely broad, so broad, in fact,
that if literally interpreted, it could be applied to prevent anybody
from ever doing anything. For example, farm land can certainly
be regarded as a natural resource which would be destroyed by
using it for a gravel pit. Nonetheless, it seems improbable that the
courts will flatly rule that no farm land may be used for gravel
extraction. Presumably, in such situations, the courts will apply the
"no feasible and prudent alternative" language, at least in some
circumstances, to hold that the act does not prevent removal.
Perhaps the statute will have its major impact on cases pat-
terned after Buckley." 7 Since vegetation and scenic resources may
well be regarded 'as natural resources, their potential destruction
by the removal of a hill or the digging of a pond may provide
the relationship to the public health, safety and welfare that the
113. Id. § 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1974).
114. MICII. CONST. art. 4, § 52 (1963).
115. 1969-70 MiCH. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 17, 19-31.
116. State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 220 N.W.2d 416 (1974).
117. 343 Mich. 83, 72 N.W.2d 210 (1955).
THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE
justices could not perceive in Buckley. However, in some cases
there may be complicating factors. For example, it is rather gener-
ally recognized that the quantity of our land resource is finite and
land should be put to good use and not wasted. Very often, the
existence of a hill or dune drastically reduces the usability of land
for other purposes. For example, when urban planners are com-
puting land capability for housing units, they customarily assign
much .higher densities to flat lands than to rugged or hilly property.
As a result, the removal of a hill or dune may not be actually
destructive of natural resources but -may simply make them avail-
able for full use in addition to making the minerals removed available
for various human needs. It should be remembered that the con-
stitutional provision upon which the act is based speaks not of
preservation but of "conservation and development." 118 Therefore,
in deciding a Buckley type case,119 the court may, on the particular
facts, conclude that there is no pollution, impairment or destruction,
when looking at the picture as a whole and balancing scenic loss
against land usability gain, and never get to the question of alter-
natives.
Alternatives will undoubtedly play an important part in cases
where the miner's claims are based on Miller 20 and Paris'21 and
he insists that there is an important need for the minerals and
that no serious consequence will be shown to follow from removal.
Here, the alternative may well be either taking the material from
some other place which will also have adverse environmental con-
sequences, or shutting down the industries which require the ma-
terials. In cases of this kind there will also be arguments about
whether the impairment or destruction of natural resources as a
result of mining operations constitutes a serious consequence. In
this respect, the Act no doubt increases the burden on the miner,
unless, as pointed out above, he can show a net environmental
benefit by making the 'land resource more usable.
Before concluding, -it is necessary to make some comment upon
what is probably the most important problem in connection with
the use of zoning laws to control mineral removal. The majority
brought it to public attention in Paris, but the courts have made
little mention of it since. Although a gravel pit may provide ma-
terials for road building and construction only within or close to
the community exercising zoning control, most other mineral re-
moval operations affect the economic well being of an area far
118. MICH. CONsT. art. 4, § 52 (1963).
119. 343 Mich. 83, 72 N.W.2d 210 (1955).
120. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929).
121. 349 Mich. 296, 84 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
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beyond and of people whose numbers vastly exceed the population
of the jurisdiction where the minerals are found. Local officials
frequently have little perception of the impact of their decisions
and, in any event, are not motivated to consider consequences of
their actions upon persons other than their local constituents. It
seems clear that zoning laws are not really appropriate means
for determining which mineral deposits are to be extracted and
which left in place as long as Michigan, like most other states,
continues bowing to the sacred cow of home rule and leaves zoning
entirely to local authorities. It is clear that planning and regulations
on a much broader geographic scale are necessary to the achieve-
ment of rational results. Unfortunately, the courts have only 'limit-
ed leverage here. Judges can complain about the lack of regional
and statewide planning and decision making process and can refuse
to enforce zoning laws which fail to adequately consider interests
beyond those of the municipality, but until state legislatures recog-
nize the importance of the problem and take action, nothing much
will happen. Unless, of course, Congress uses, in recognition of
the important obstructions to interstate commerce which local of-
ficials can create, state inaction to justify imposing federal planning
and control.
